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1. Introduction 
 
One of the most notorious features of the financial economics literature in the decade has been the 
increase importance of financial markets in promoting growth, and the relative importance of banks 
and stock markets in influencing economic development
1
. The frontier of the literature in this field 
is shifting towards providing answers to the question of why some countries are more financially 
developed than others. In this context, a deeper understanding of the sources of financial market 
development is becoming more and more relevant for the design of successful policies to promote 
financial development, since higher financial depth would facilitate economic growth, as shown by 
the extensive empirical literature.  
While the existing literature has focused mainly on the roles of financial liberalization, legal 
system (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998; Roe, 2008), government ownership of banks (La Porta et al. 
2000; Andrianova et al. 2008), political economy (Girma and Shortland, 2008; Roe and Siegel, 
2008), trade openness (Beck 2001, 2002; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Baltagi et al. 2007) as the 
sources of financial development
2
, we contribute to the literature by examining the impact of 
institutional quality on financial development. The importance of institutional quality factor has 
caught the attention of economists in a variety of fields. North (1990) defines institutions as the 
human constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They comprise both 
formal rules (property rights, constitutions and laws) and informal constraints (unwritten taboos, 
customs, traditions and codes of conduct). When the rules change persistently or are not respected, 
when corruption is widespread and rule enforcement is fragile, or when property rights are not well 
defined, there is likely to be a problem with the quality of the institutions. Since the allocation of 
resources, the delivery of services and fair judgement will be less than desirable and the actual 
achievements will be less than the supposed aims. Problems related to institutional quality may 
translate into an increased degree of uncertainty that sends misleading signals to the market, thus 
affecting the productive economic process.  
Financial economists’ belief efficient working institutions are demanded to manage risk that 
comes from the financial markets. The quality of institutions and legal framework are likely to 
                                                 
1
 See Levine (1997) for an excellent review of the link between financial development and economic growth based on 
cross-countries, time series, panel data and firm levels empirical studies. 
2
 Dematriades and Andrianova (2004) provide an excellent review of a large body of theoretical and empirical literature 
that tries to explain the determinants of financial development.  
  
2 
affect financial development through the ability of financial sector to channel resources to finance 
productive activities. In the absence of an adequate regulatory framework and supervision, the 
ability of financial markets to mobilize funds may be strongly undermined by lack of depositors’ 
confidence. This will drift funds abroad and generally away from viable domestic investment 
opportunities.  
Recently, a large number of papers have established that financial development fosters 
growth and that a country’s financial development is related to its institutional characteristics, 
including its legal framework (Arestis and Demetriades, 1996). Claessens and Leaven (2003) point 
out that improved asset allocation due to better property rights has an effect on growth in sectoral 
value added equal to improved access to financing arising from greater financial development. 
Garretsen et al. (2004) also show that societal norms and culture help to explain differences in 
cross-country financial development. Demetriades and Andrianova (2004) argue that the strength of 
institutions, such as financial regulation and the rule of law, may determine the success or failure of 
financial reforms. Chinn and Ito (2006) find that financial systems with a higher degree of 
legal/institutional development on average benefit more from financial liberalisation than those with 
a lower one. So far there are only a few studies that associate institutional quality with financial 
development, and most of the evidence provided by all these previous studies is focused on the 
quality of legal systems and property rights. Thus, the role of institutions in influencing financial 
development still remains an open question to be addressed.  
The objective of this study is to examine the effect of institutional quality on financial 
development based on panel data analysis across developed and developing countries. This study 
extends the literature in three dimensions. First, a linear and a nonlinear dynamic panel data models 
are set up to test the linear and non-linear financial development-institutional quality relationships. 
This can be considered as one of the pioneer empirical works that used the robust dynamic panel 
system GMM approach to estimate the nonlinear relationship. Secondly, the models are estimated 
based on the newly assembled institutional quality measure developed by Kaufmann et al. (2008) 
that consists of various set of institutional quality variables, which are able to assess what 
dimensions of the quality of institutions affect financial development. Thirdly, two sets of financial 
development indicators are employed; they are the private-sector credit of the banking sector, and 
the stock market capitalization of the stock market, in order to capture the various aspects of 
financial deepening.  
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dynamic panel data models and 
the related hypotheses. Section 3 explains the econometric method and the data employed. Section 4 
reports the estimated results and interprets the findings, and the final section concludes the 
discussion. 
 
2. Legal system, institutions and financial development: review of literature 
Over the last decade, a literature has begun to emerge that attempts to use data from a large number 
of countries to establish the relevance of legal systems for financial development. The work has its 
origins in La Porta et al. (1997) who correlate the relation between the legal systems and financial 
intermediary development. La Porta et al. (1997) compares legal rules across 49 countries by 
dividing into four legal systems, namely: English common law; French; German and Scandinavian 
civil laws. The legal environment variables uses in their study are the legal and regulatory treatment 
of creditors, the efficiency of the legal system in enforcing contracts, and accounting standards. 
They find that the legal environment as described by both legal rules and their enforcement has an 
influenced on the size and extent of a country’s capital markets, including equity and debt markets. 
The legal rules protecting investors and the quality of their enforcement differ greatly and 
systematically across countries. In other words, the quantity of external finance is, in part, 
determined by legal tradition. According to them, a good legal environment protects the potential 
financiers against expropriation by entrepreneurs; it raises their willingness to surrender funds in 
exchange for securities, and hence expands the scope of capital markets. Moreover, La Porta et al. 
(1997) demonstrate that in the area of protection against expropriation by insiders, common law 
countries protect both shareholders and creditors the most, French civil law countries the least, and 
German civil law and Scandinavian civil law countries somewhere in the middle.  
Levine (1998) examines the connection between the legal environment and financial 
development, and then tracing this link through to long run economic growth. First, he finds that the 
legal and regulatory environment matters for financial development. Countries with legal and 
regulatory systems that give a high priority to creditors receiving the full present value of their 
claims on corporations have better functioning financial intermediaries than countries where the 
legal system provides much weaker support to creditors. Second, the empirical results indicate that 
contract enforcement is significant to determine financial development. Countries that impose 
compliance with laws efficiently and enforce contracts including government contract effectively 
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tend to have much better developed financial intermediaries than countries where enforcement is 
more lax.  Finally, he discovers that information disclosure also plays an important role in 
determining financial development. For instance, countries where corporations publish relatively 
comprehensive and accurate financial statements have better developed financial intermediaries 
than countries where published information on corporations is less reliable.  
Beck et al. (2001) examine whether cross-country differences in financial development are 
accounted for by cross-country differences in (i) legal tradition; (ii) political structure; (iii) initial 
endowments by employing cross-country regressions. Their findings are consistent with the law and 
finance view (La Porta et al. 1997). Differences in legal origin – whether a country has a British, 
French, German or Scandinavian legal heritage – help explain the development of financial markets 
today even after controlling for the level of economic development, regional dummy variables, 
religious composition, ethnic diversity, openness to international trade, the fraction of years the 
country has been independent since 1776, the transplant effect, initial endowment, and the political 
environment. Compared to other legal families, countries with a French legal tradition tend to have 
weak financial institutions. They have less transparent corporate financial statements, poorer 
property rights protection, weaker protection of the rights of shareholders and debt holders, and 
lower levels of stock market and bank development. Common law and civil law countries have 
comparatively strong financial institutions. Besides, the data also provide qualified support for the 
endowment view. Countries with high levels of settler mortality during the earlier stages of 
colonization tend to have substantially lower levels of financial institutions development today.  
Lombardo and Pagano (2000) investigate the cross-country relationship between the quality 
of institutions and the rate of return on equity. Their data set includes almost all the countries of the 
study by La Porta et al. (1997). They find that indicators of the general quality of the legal 
environment have a consistently positive correlation with the risk-adjusted rate of return, whereas 
measures of the protection of shareholders rights have either no or negative impact on the return on 
equity. In their study, Lombardo and Pagano (2000) employ two different measures of the rate of 
return on equity, namely the percentage return on each market stock index and accounting measures 
such as the dividend yield ratio and the earnings/price ratio. In a regression that uses the percentage 
return on each market stock index as a dependent variable, general measures of the quality of the 
legal environment appear as important explanatory determinants. Variables measuring the 
protection of shareholder rights do not appear to have additional explanatory power. The correlation 
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between respect for the law or judicial efficiency and the risk-adjusted rate of return on equity is 
positive and statistically significant. The implied effects are economically large. Increases in the 
respect for the law have a comparable impact on secondary market returns. When the rate of return 
on equity is measured by accounting variables, they find that the effects of general measures of 
institutional quality are still positive and even larger statistically significant.  
 
3. Empirical model, methodology and the data 
The empirical specification is aimed at explaining the determinants of financial development by 
testing the role of institutions. Thus, the empirical model that employed in the analysis is as follows: 
 
ln FDit = 0i + 1i ln FDit-1 + 2i ln INSit + 3i ln RGDPCit + i + it   (1) 
 
where FD is financial development, INS is institutional quality, RGDPC  is real GDP per capita, the  
subscripts i and t index countries and time respectively. In addition, the specification also contains 
an unobservable country-specific effect  and error-term . 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that interest groups, specifically industrial and financial 
incumbents, frequently stand to lose from financial development, because it usually breeds 
competition, which erodes their rents. They argue that incumbents’ opposition will be weaker when 
an economy is open to both trade and capital flows, hence the opening of both the trade and capital 
accounts holds the key to successful financial development. This is not only because trade and 
financial openness limit the ability of incumbents to block the development of financial markets but 
also because the new opportunities created by openness may generate sufficient new profits for 
them that outweigh the negative effects of increased competition. Thus, they will be more likely to 
support reforms that promote a deeper and more efficient financial system. In fact, research 
indicates that deeper financial sector is positively associated with greater trade openness (Rajan and 
Zingales, 2003; Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2002, Huang and Temple, 2005). Therefore, Equation (1) is 
extended to incorporate trade openness (TO) and financial openness (FO). Thus, the basic financial 
development equation is extended as follows:  
 
ln FDit = 0i + 1i ln FDit-1 + 2i ln INSit + 3i ln RGDPCit + 4i ln TO + 5i ln FOit + i + it     (2) 
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The relationship between institutional quality and financial development might be nonlinear. 
Institutional reforms have generally a positive effect on financial development but the magnitude 
might be varied with the level of economic development. We hypothesize that the effect of 
institutional quality on financial development is ambiguous at low levels of development, while it 
becomes eventually positive as development proceeds or U-shaped relationship between financial 
development and institutions. In order to examine the nonlinear relationship between financial 
development and institutions, the squared term of institutional quality variable is added and 
included into Equation (2), and thus regression model can be rewritten as follows:       
 
ln FDit = 0i + 1i ln FDit-1 + 2i ln INSit + 3i ln INS
2
it + 4i ln RGDPCit + 5i ln TO +  
                 5i ln FOit + i + it                       (3) 
 
The U-shaped nonlinear relationship predicts 2 < 0 and 3 > 0. Equations (2) and (3) provide the 
basis for the empirical models that are estimated in this study. The econometrics method employed 
to estimate the equations is based on the dynamic panel Generalized Method of Moment (GMM).  
 
Dynamic panel system GMM estimators 
The methodology of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) for panel data analyses
3
, suggested 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) and then further developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), is employed 
to control for endogeneity in the specifications. Consider the following model 
 
                Yit = 1EXit + 2EPit + i + it    i = 1,...,N ; t = 1,..., T                 (4) 
 
where Y is a given dependent variable, EX is a vector of strictly exogenous covariates; EP denotes a 
vector of predetermined covariates and endogenous covariates (predetermined variables are 
assumed to be correlated with past errors, while endogenous ones are assumed to be correlated with 
past and present errors); vi is the unobserved group-level effect, and it is the error term, with the 
                                                 
3
 The GMM estimator has been widely employed in recent empirical works, particularly in the studies of 
macroeconomics and finance. This method has a number of advantages. For instance, Beck et al. (2000) argue that the 
GMM panel estimator is good in exploiting the time-series variation in the data, accounting for unobserved individual 
specific effects, and therefore providing better control for endogeneity of all the explanatory variables.  
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assumption that vi and it are independent for each i over all t, and that there is no autocorrelation in 
the it.  
First, in order to eliminate the unobservable group-specific effects, we difference Equation 
(4) and then it can be rewritten as 
 
                Yit – Yit-1= 1(EXit – EXit-1) + 2(EPit – EPit-1) + (it –it)           (5) 
 
Second, instrumental-variable approaches are applied to deal with the endogeneity of explanatory 
variables in Equation (5), where the predetermined and endogenous variables in first differences are 
instrumented with appropriate lags of the specified variables in levels, while strictly exogenous 
regressors are first-differenced for use as instruments in the first-differenced equation. However, the 
efficiency of this instrumental approach may be relatively weak, given the fact that lagged levels are 
often poor instruments for first differences. Therefore, Blundell and Bond (1998) propose the 
System-GMM approach, in which the first-differenced estimator (i.e., Equation (5)) is combined 
with the estimator in levels (i.e., Equation (4)) to form a more efficient “system estimator”: for the 
first-differenced equation, the instruments are the same as that discussed above; for the levels 
equation, predetermined and endogenous variables in levels are instrumented with appropriate lags 
of their own first differences, while the strictly exogenous regressors can directly enter the 
instrument matrix for use in the levels equation. 
 
 The data 
The data set consists of a panel of observations for a group of (i) 63 countries – where the financial 
development as proxy of private sector credit; (ii) 51 countries – where the financial development as 
proxy of stock market capitalization. The sample period for both data sets is spanning from 1996 to 
2004 but with gaps
4
. The list of countries is presented in Tables 1a and 1b.  
Two financial development indicators are employed in the analysis, namely private sector 
credit and stock market capitalization. All these two financial development indicators are expressed 
as ratios to GDP. The source of these annual data is the World Development Indicators (World 
Bank CD-ROM 2006). Annual data on real GDP per capita (based on 2000 US dollar constant 
prices) and trade openness (sum of exports and imports of goods and services) are obtained from the 
                                                 
4
 The sample period is from 1996, then 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2004. 
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World Development Indicators. The financial openness indicator is from Lane and Milesi-Feretti 
(2006). This indicator is defined as the volume of a country’s foreign assets and liabilities (% of 
GDP). This measure provides a useful summary of a country’s history of capital account openness. 
The institutional quality data sets we employed in the analysis are newly assembled dataset 
by Kaufmann et al. (2008). These indicators are constructed based on information gathered through 
a wide variety of cross-country surveys as well as polls of experts. Kaufmann et al. (2008) use a 
model of unobserved components, which enables them to achieve levels of coverage of 
approximately 212 countries for each of their indicators. They construct six different indicators, 
each representing a different dimension of governance: (i) Voice and Accountability, (ii) Political 
Stability and Lack of Violence, (iii) Government Effectiveness, (iv) Regulatory Quality, (v) Rule of 
Law, and (vi) Control of Corruption. This clustering of institutional indicators into different 
dimensions allows us to study whether some dimensions of governance matter for financial market 
development, while others do not. The descriptive statistics of the variables are summarized in 
Tables 1a and 1b, each of which corresponds to the data used in each of the two subsequent tables 
of estimated results. The definition of the above institutional quality indicators are provided in 
Table A (Appendix). 
Tables 2a and 2b present the correlations between financial development and the various 
variables employed in the analysis. The results reveal that institutional quality variables are indeed 
positively correlated with financial development. For example, the government effectiveness (GE) 
has the highest correlation with private sector credit and stock market capitalization, with 0.78 and 
0.65, respectively. Besides, the institutional quality indicators are also positively correlated with 
each other, where the correlation coefficient ranges between 0.67 and 0.78 in the first dataset, and 
0.52 – 0.65 in the second dataset.  
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Table 1a: Summary of Financial development proxy: private sector credit 
 (Annual Data: 1996 – 2004; N = 63) 
Variable Source Unit of Measurement Mean Standard 
Deviatio
n 
Max Min 
Private Sector Credit WDI % of GDP 58.50 48.57 196.65 0.85 
Voice and Accountability Kaufmann et al. (2008) Standard deviation 56.80 27.92 98.40 2.87 
Political Stability Kaufmann et al. (2008) Standard deviation 46.76 29.01 98.23 1.83 
Government Effectiveness Kaufmann et al. (2008) Standard deviation 58.56 27.96 98.56 2.6 
Regulatory Quality Kaufmann et al. (2008) Standard deviation 59.89 25.86 98.20 2.7 
Rule of Law Kaufmann et al. (2008) Standard deviation 55.17 29.23 99.75 0.97 
Corruption Kaufmann et al. (2008) Standard deviation 55.11 29.51 99.83 1.85 
Real GDP Per Capita WDI US$ at 2000 prices 8576.55 10932.09 37375.9 149.10 
Financial Openness  Lane & Milesi-Ferreti (2006) % of GDP 214.80 215.16 1346.50 47.79 
Trade Openness WDI % of GDP 71.60 37.23 209.67 21.41 
Countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Dominican, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, South Africa, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, Uruguay, US, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
 
 
Table 1b: Summary of financial development proxy: stock market development  
(Annual Data: 1996 – 2004; N = 51) 
Variable Source Unit of 
Measurement 
Mean Standard 
Deviatio
n 
Max Min 
Stock Market Capitalization  WDI % of GDP 54.51 49.04 227.76 1.44 
Voice and Accountability Kaufmann et al. (2008) Standard deviation 61.63 26.41 98.40 15.22 
Political Stability Kaufmann et al. (2008) Standard deviation 49.84 29.58 98.23 4.71 
Government Effectiveness Kaufmann et al. (2008) Standard deviation 64.12 26.13 98.56 13.18 
Regulatory Quality Kaufmann et al. (2008) Standard deviation 64.66 24.19 97.72 9.11 
Rule of Law Kaufmann et al. (2008) Standard deviation 60.19 28.30 99.75 6.18 
Corruption Kaufmann et al. (2008) Standard deviation 59.59 29.15 99.83 5.67 
Real GDP Per Capita WDI US$ at 2000 prices 9872.99 11429.05 37375.9 255.47 
Financial Openness  Lane & Milesi-Ferreti (2006) % of GDP 224.47 227.68 1346.50 47.79 
Trade Openness WDI % of GDP 71.88 39.56 209.67 21.41 
Countries: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Malta, 
Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, Uruguay, US, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
Table 2a: Correlations for financial development proxy: private sector credit  
 PRI VA PS GE RQ ROL CORR RGDPC TO FO 
PRI 1.00          
VA 0.67 1.00         
PS 0.70 0.88 1.00        
GE 0.78 0.90 0.86 1.00       
RQ 0.72 0.92 0.87 0.95 1.00      
ROL 0.77 0.89 0.91 0.96 0.92 1.00     
CORR 0.75 0.88 0.89 0.96 0.93 0.97 1.00    
RGDPC 0.73 0.79 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.81 0.80 1.00   
TO 0.27 0.18 0.33 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.04 1.00  
FO 0.45 0.52 0.61 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.52 0.55 0.48 1.00 
Notes: PRI = private sector credit, VA = voice and accountability; PS = political stability; GE = government effectiveness; RQ = 
regulatory quality; ROL = rule of law; CORR = corruption; RGDPC = real GDP per capita; TO = trade openness and FO = financial 
openness.  
  
10 
 
Table 2b: Correlations  for financial development proxy: stock market capitalization   
 SMC VA PS GE RQ ROL CORR RGDPC TO FO 
SMC 1.00          
VA 0.52 1.00         
PS 0.52 0.89 1.00        
GE 0.65 0.87 0.87 1.00       
RQ 0.58 0.90 0.86 0.95 1.00      
ROL 0.61 0.89 0.91 0.96 0.92 1.00     
CORR 0.63 0.87 0.89 0.97 0.93 0.97 1.00    
RGDPC 0.56 0.79 0.81 0.77 0.74 0.81 0.79 1.00   
TO 0.22 0.11 0.29 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.17 -0.01 1.00  
FO 0.43 0.52 0.60 0.49 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.46 1.00 
Notes: SMC = stock market capitalization; VA = voice and accountability; PS = political stability; GE = government effectiveness; 
RQ = regulatory quality; ROL = rule of law; CORR = corruption; RGDPC = real GDP per capita; TO = trade openness and FO = 
financial openness.  
 
 
4. Empirical results 
Table 3 presents the empirical results of the linear model (Equation 2) using the dynamic panel 
GMM approach. The financial development indicator employed in the estimations is private sector 
credit. In Models 1a – 6a, we introduce Kaufmann et al. (2008) six institutional quality variables 
into specifications, whereas Model 7a consists of two institutional quality dimensions, namely 
political stability and freedom and government efficiency
5
 in order to reduce measurement errors of 
the individual components. In addition, if various institutional dimensions determine simultaneously 
the development of financial market, by including them one by one might be an omitted variable 
bias.  
The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant, which implies that the dynamic 
GMM is an appropriate estimator and the empirical results can be relied upon to carry out statistical 
inference. The coefficients of real GDP per capita and trade openness are positive, but only real 
GDP per capita is statistically significant determinant of financial development
6
. In contrast, the 
coefficient of financial openness is negative and significant determinant of private sector credit at 
conventional levels. All institutional quality indicators exert a positive effect on financial 
development, but only political stability, government effectiveness and rule of law are statistically 
determinants of financial development. The largest effect seems to be associated with government 
effectiveness, where the coefficient of this variable is the highest among the significant institutional 
                                                 
5
 The political stability and freedom consists of the average of voice and accountability and political stability, whereas 
government efficiency consists of the average of rule of law, corruption, government effectiveness and regulatory 
quality.  
6
 The insignificant results of trade openness may due to the measurement utilized in the study, which is the sum of 
exports and imports divided by GDP. Further discussion on measuring trade openness, see Squalli and Wilson (2006). 
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quality indicators. The empirical result of Model 7a that incorporates two clusters of institutional 
quality also shows that both indicators namely political stability and freedom, and government 
efficiency are significant in explaining financial development.  
 
Table 3: Financial development and institutional quality (Linear model, Equation 2) 
Dependent variable: Private Sector Credit  
 Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a Model 7a 
Constant  -0.39 
(-0.65) 
0.42  
(0.73) 
-0.02 
(-0.03) 
0.43 
(0.67) 
-0.004 
(-0.01) 
0.34 
(0.56) 
0.16 
(0.27) 
FDit-1 0.73 
(11.67)*** 
0.78 
(15.10)*** 
0.66 
(9.43)*** 
0.79 
(12.16)*** 
0.69 
(9.09)*** 
0.77 
(11.16)*** 
0.73 
(11.79)*** 
RGDPC 0.17 
(3.21)*** 
0.17 
(3.36)*** 
0.22 
(2.98)*** 
0.23 
(2.92)*** 
0.25 
(3.42)*** 
0.20 
(2.74)*** 
0.16 
(3.10)*** 
Trade Openness 0.16 
(0.98) 
0.03 
(0.19) 
0.04 
(0.30) 
0.04 
(0.26) 
0.14 
(0.86) 
0.03 
(0.23) 
0.03 
(0.20) 
Financial Openness -0.20 
(-2.20)** 
-0.30 
(-4.06)*** 
-0.28 
(-2.37)** 
-0.37 
(-3.86)*** 
-0.36 
(-3.37)*** 
-0.30 
(-3.28)*** 
-0.28 
(-3.55)*** 
Voice & Accountability 0.09 
(1.46) 
- - - - - - 
Political Stability - 0.12 
(2.27)** 
- - - - - 
Government 
Effectiveness 
- - 0.21 
(2.26)** 
- - - - 
Regulatory Quality - - - 0.07 
(0.82) 
- - - 
Rule of Law - - - - 0.10 
(2.19)** 
- - 
Corruption - - - - - 0.09 
(1.43) 
- 
Political Stability and 
Freedom 
- - - - - - 0.10 
(2.07)** 
Government Efficiency  - - - - - - 0.13 
(2.14)** 
Hansen test of Over 
Identifying Restrictions 
57.72 
(0.832) 
47.95 
(0.826) 
60.87 
(0.747) 
60.29 
(0.764) 
60.12 
(0.768) 
60.11 
(0.769) 
56.08 
(0.987) 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) 
-3.03 
(0.002)*** 
-3.05 
(0.002)*** 
-3.21 
(0.001)*** 
-3.19 
(0.001)*** 
-3.14 
(0.002)*** 
-3.14 
(0.002)*** 
-3.12 
(0.002)*** 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) 
-0.60 
(0.551) 
-0.57 
(0.570) 
-0.40 
(0.691) 
-0.51 
(0.611) 
-0.54 
(0.591) 
-0.34 
(0.732) 
-0.47 
(0.640) 
Notes: All models are estimated using the Arellano and Bond dynamic panel system GMM estimations (Stata xtabond2 command). 
Figures in the parentheses are t-statistics, except for Hansen test and Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation, which are p-values.  ** 
and *** indicate the respective 5% and 1% significance levels. Political Stability and Freedom = average of voice & accountability 
and political stability. Government Efficiency = average of government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption.    
The estimated models in Table 3 are relatively well specified, as all the three diagnostic statistics are found to be 
satisfactory. The Hansen test does not reject the over-identification restrictions. As expected, the null hypothesis of 
absence of first order serial correlation (AR1) is rejected, but the null hypothesis of absence of second order serial 
correlation (AR2) is not rejected. 
 
 
 
The significant of rule of law in determining banking sector development is consistent with La Porta 
et al. (1997) law and finance literature, as well as inline with Demetriades and Andrianova (2004), 
where these two studies demonstrate that legal infrastructure is robust in explaining cross-country 
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differences in financial development. Besides, the significant of political stability also support 
previous research that political stability is associated with financial development, namely Roe and 
Siegel (2008), who find that political instability impedes financial development, and political 
stability is a primary determinant of differences in financial development around the world. 
 
 
Table 4: Financial Development and Institutional Quality (Linear model, Equation 2) 
Dependent variable: stock market capitalization   
 Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b Model 5b Model 6b Model 7b 
Constant  
 
0.26 
(0.22) 
0.23 
(0.28) 
0.53 
(0.58) 
0.83 
(7.85)*** 
0.30 
(0.28) 
0.66 
(0.65) 
0.63 
(0.77) 
FDit-1 0.62 
(6.62)*** 
0.63 
(6.53)*** 
0.66 
(6.87)*** 
0.67 
(7.85)*** 
0.67 
(7.85)*** 
0.68 
(6.85)*** 
0.68 
(7.94)*** 
RGDPC 0.26 
(2.21)** 
0.38 
(2.86)*** 
0.26 
(1.65)* 
0.29 
(2.13)** 
0.30 
(2.38)** 
0.24 
(2.45)** 
0.29 
(1.99)** 
Trade Openness 0.10 
(0.42) 
0.14 
(0.65) 
0.05 
(0.26) 
0.02 
(0.16) 
0.16 
(0.68) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
0.03 
(0.19) 
Financial Openness -0.36 
(-1.72) 
-0.39 
(-1.89) 
-0.38 
(-1.49) 
-0.38 
(-1.48) 
-0.41 
(-1.72) 
-0.23 
(-1.31) 
-0.41 
(-1.66) 
Voice & Accountability 0.13 
(0.70) 
- - - - - - 
Political Stability - -0.15 
(-1.06) 
- - - - - 
Government Effectiveness - - 0.11 
(0.54) 
- - - - 
Regulatory Quality - - - 0.04 
(0.41) 
- - - 
Rule of Law - - - - 0.02 
(0.12) 
- - 
Corruption - - - - - -0.03 
(-0.22) 
- 
Political Stability and 
Freedom 
- - - - - - 0.14 
(0.44) 
Government Efficiency  - - - - - - -0.06 
(-0.22) 
Hansen test of Over 
Identifying Restrictions 
47.41 
(0.959) 
43.98 
(0.983) 
44.67 
(0.980) 
45.04 
(0.977) 
43.55 
(0.985) 
46.14 
(0.970) 
44.76 
(0.999) 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) 
-2.56 
(0.010)*** 
-2.64 
(0.008)*** 
-2.51 
(0.012)** 
-2.92 
(0.003)*** 
-2.84 
(0.005)*** 
-2.54 
(0.011)** 
-2.78 
(0.005)*** 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) 
-0.97 
(0.334) 
-0.88 
(0.381) 
-0.97 
(0.331) 
-0.87 
(0.384) 
-1.02 
(0.985) 
-0.98 
(0.970) 
-0.92 
(0.357) 
N 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
Note:  See Table 3.    
 
 
In order to examine the extent to which the above findings vary with different aspect of financial 
development, we repeat the analysis but using the stock market capitalization as proxy of financial 
development and the results are reported in Table 4. The coefficients of real GDP per capita and 
trade openness are similar to those reported in Table 3, both have positive sign and again only real 
GDP per capita is statistically significant determinant of stock market development. The financial 
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openness variable remains negative but is insignificant in influencing stock market development. 
Surprisingly, none of the institutional quality variables is statistically significant determinant of 
stock market development. This finding suggests that different financial development indicator 
response differently to institutional quality variable, where the effect on institutional quality on 
financial development is only robust for banking sector development. However, as the sample 
consists of developing countries of which many are severely underdeveloped, the use of stock 
market measures might not be a good representative of financial development. The literature 
suggests that most developing countries go with the banking system as their choice in channelling 
funds between savers and investors. Only when the economy reaches a certain developmental stage, 
their stock markets are allowed to develop further.  
Table 5 reports the estimated results of Equation (3), which examine the nonlinear 
relationship between financial development and institutions. In the specification, an additional 
squared term for the measures of institutions factor is included in the estimation to allow for the 
formation of the U shape movement. The empirical results indicate that the regulatory quality is the 
only institutions quality indicator that has nonlinear relationship, irrespective the financial 
development is proxied by private sector credit or stock market capitalization. The coefficients on 
the regulatory quality and its squared term are negative and positive, respectively. This suggests a 
U-shaped financial development-institutional quality relationship. Again, all three diagnostic 
statistics are found to be satisfactory.  
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Table 5: Financial development and institutional quality (Nonlinear model, Equation 3) 
Dependent variable: financial development (FD)  
 FD = Private Sector Credit FD = Stock Market Capitalization 
 Model 
1a 
Model 
2a 
Model 
3a 
Model 
4a 
Model 
5a 
Model 
6a 
Model 
1b 
Model 
2b 
Model 
3b 
Model 
4b 
Model 
5b 
Model 
6b 
Constant  
 
-0.95 
(-0.62) 
0.73 
(1.18) 
0.29 
(0.47) 
1.80 
(2.90)
*** 
0.58 
(0.74) 
1.55 
(1.68)
 
6.61 
(1.98) 
1.56 
(1.07) 
7.43 
(2.94)
*** 
1.81 
(2.33) 
2.20 
(1.33) 
3.90 
(2.71)
*** 
FDit-1 0.73 
(10.58)
*** 
0.80 
(16.18)
*** 
0.68 
(11.42)
*** 
0.76 
(15.83)
*** 
0.71 
(10.43)
*** 
0.80 
(15.19)
***
 
0.61 
(7.61)
*** 
0.61 
(7.09)
*** 
0.62 
(7.20)
*** 
0.67 
(8.17)
*** 
0.58 
(8.15)
*** 
0.64 
(7.72)
*** 
RGDPC 0.16 
(2.31)
** 
0.12 
(2.88)
*** 
0.15 
(2.27)
** 
0.11 
(1.84)
 
0.17 
(3.01)
*** 
0.08 
(1.76) 
0.01 
(0.09)
 
0.28 
(2.02)
** 
0.10 
(0.79) 
0.24 
(2.07)
** 
0.23 
(1.85) 
0.10 
(0.93)
 
TO 0.16 
(0.99) 
0.05 
(0.38) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
-0.13 
(-1.02) 
0.07 
(0.47) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.12 
(-0.47) 
0.06 
(0.29) 
-0.17 
(-1.06) 
-0.09 
(-0.67)
 
0.09 
(0.36) 
-0.09 
(-0.44) 
FO -0.17 
(-1.61) 
-0.31 
(-3.98)
*** 
-0.25 
(-2.33)
** 
-0.30 
(-3.21)
***
 
-0.32 
(-3.75)
*** 
-0.27 
(-3.78)
*** 
-0.32 
(-1.58) 
-0.40 
(-2.11)
** 
-0.33 
(-1.90) 
-0.42 
(-2.14)
** 
-0.41 
(-2.02)
** 
-0.28 
(-1.68) 
VA 0.18 
(0.44)
 
- - - - - -2.59 
(-1.84) 
- - - - - 
VA
2 
 
-0.01 
(-0.14) 
     0.45 
(1.95) 
     
PS - -0.03 
(-0.29)
 
- - - - - -0.46 
(-1.06)
 
- - - - 
PS
2 
 
 0.03 
(1.69) 
     0.08 
(0.94)
 
    
GE - - 0.12 
(0.78)
 
- - - - - 0.48 
(1.79)
 
- - - 
GE
2 
 
  0.03 
(0.89) 
     0.10 
(0.79) 
   
RQ - - - -0.40 
(-3.78)
*** 
- - - - - -0.28 
(-2.23)
** 
- - 
RQ
2
 
 
   0.12 
(3.88)
*** 
     0.07 
(2.14)
** 
  
ROL - - - - -0.05 
(-0.28)
 
- - - - - -0.81 
(-1.72) 
- 
ROL
2 
 
    0.04 
(1.14) 
    - 0.15 
(1.59) 
 
CORR - - - - - -0.46 
(-1.35)
 
- - - - - -0.37 
(-1.53)
 
CORR
2 
 
     0.11 
(1.82) 
     0.25 
(1.60)
 
Hansen test 
of Over 
Identifying 
Restrictions
 
49.89 
(0.998) 
54.11 
(0.993) 
55.99 
(0.988) 
53.15 
(0.994) 
59.79 
(0.969) 
56.83 
(0.983) 
44.92 
(0.999) 
45.66 
(0.999) 
45.70 
(0.999) 
45.71 
(0.999) 
45.68 
(0.999) 
27.94 
(0.263) 
Arellano-
Bond test 
for AR(1) 
-2.97 
(0.003) 
-3.12 
(0.002) 
-3.18 
(0.001) 
-2.94 
(0.003) 
-3.11 
(0.002) 
-2.99 
(0.003) 
-2.77 
(0.006) 
-2.66 
(0.008) 
-2.61 
(0.009) 
-2.85 
(0.004) 
-2.71 
(0.007) 
-1.80 
(0.072) 
Arellano-
Bond test 
for AR(2) 
-0.61 
(0.543) 
-0.40 
(0.690) 
-0.31 
(0.756) 
0.37 
(0.715) 
-0.35 
(0.725) 
-0.23 
(0.816) 
-0.47 
(0.641) 
-0.89 
(0.375) 
-0.91 
(0.364) 
-0.89 
(0.376) 
-0.99 
(0.321) 
-0.03 
(0.978) 
Notes:  All models are estimated using the Arellano and Bond dynamic panel system GMM estimations (Stata xtabond2 command). 
Figures in the parentheses are t-statistics, except for Hansen test and Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation, which are p-values. ** 
and *** indicate the respective 5% and 1% significance levels. RGDPC = real GDP per capita; TO = trade openness and FO = 
financial openness. VA = voice and accountability; PS = political stability; GE = government effectiveness; RQ = regulatory quality; 
ROL = rule of law; CORR = corruption.  
 
 
In order to shed additional light on the quantitative importance of regulatory quality for financial 
development under the U-shaped relationship, we try to determine the threshold level institutional 
quality in term of regulatory quality for the sample countries. The threshold values for both private 
sector credit and stock market capitalization indicators are computed as 28.03 and 54.60 of 
regulatory quality
7
, respectively. In a scenario where the regulatory quality of the country is lower 
                                                 
7
 exp(3.33) = 28.03 and exp(4) = 54.60 
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than or equal to the threshold, the institutional quality will exert a negative effect on the financial 
development, meaning that the financial development will be lessened when the institutional quality 
improve. On the other hand, if the institutional quality overshoots the threshold, the institutions 
quality effect on financial development will turn positive. In other words, further institutional 
reforms will lead to financial development.  
 
Based on the cross plots of financial development verses regulatory quality of the sample countries 
as depicted in Figures 1 and 2, we can identify the countries which are fall below the threshold 
level. We observe that most of the low-income countries under study are located on the left-hand 
side of both figures or below the threshold level. As shown in Figure 1 where the financial 
development is private sector credit, the countries below the threshold level include Bangladesh, 
Bolivia, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Gabon, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. On the 
other hand, where the financial development as proxy of stock market capitalization as depicted in 
Figure 2, the countries below the threshold level are Argentina, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Venezuela, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the high-income countries are located on the right-hand side of both 
figures.  
 
                                          Figure 1: Private sector credit and regulatory quality  
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Figure 2: Stock market capitalization and regulatory quality 
 
 
 
 
This finding indicates that the regulatory quality does promote financial development but only when 
a threshold level of regulatory quality development has been achieved, a condition which is more 
common among low-income countries.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This study examines the role of institutional quality in influencing financial development across 
developed and developing countries. Although institutional quality has been gaining popularity in 
recent years especially to promote economic growth, there has been no available econometric 
evidence to trace the link between financial development and institutional quality. As financial 
development and institutional quality become a reality for sources of economic growth, it is 
important to understand how the role of institutional quality such as rule of law, corruption, political 
stability and government effectiveness affects financial development.   
The empirical results based on the dynamic panel data of GMM suggest that institutional 
quality significantly enhance financial development, especially banking sector development where 
the private sector credit is employed in the analysis. Nevertheless, some institutional aspects matter 
more than others do. Particularly, we find that rule of law, political stability and government 
effectiveness play a vital role in promoting banking sector development. The stock market 
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development indicator, on the other hand, does not show any significant influence from institutional 
quality.  Besides institutions, real GDP per capita is also statistically significant determinant of 
financial development, but financial openness seem to dampen the development of financial 
markets. 
The finding also suggests that the effectiveness of institutional quality on financial 
development is non-monotonic and depends upon the type of institutions. Among six institutional 
quality indicators, the regulatory quality indicator depicts the U-shaped relationship with financial 
development. The nonlinear evidence is robust to two financial development measures, regardless 
the financial development is proxied by banking sector development or stock market development. 
This result reveals that the regulatory quality does contribute to financial development but only 
when a threshold level of regulatory quality development has been attained, a condition which is 
more prevalent among low-income economies. Most of the low-income countries are located at the 
low side of regulatory quality, which suggested that further improvement of regulatory quality is 
crucial to further develop their financial markets. The government of these economies should 
impose well-regulated policies on financial market activities to private sector, and less restrictive 
regulatory regimes to keep away from poorly functioning financial systems. Overall, in terms of 
policy implication, the findings suggest that enhancing institutional infrastructure and identifying 
the beneficial aspects of particular institutions, would encourage the development of financial 
markets. 
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Appendix 
Table A: Definition of institutional quality indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2008) 
Indicators 
 
Definition 
Voice and Accountability 
(VA) 
The extent to which country’s citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media 
Political Stability (PS) The perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including domestic violence and terrorism 
Government Effectiveness 
(GE) 
The quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies 
Regulatory Quality (RQ) The ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development 
Rule of Law (ROL) The extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
Corruption (CORR) The extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of 
the state by elites and private interests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
